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CASES NOTED
INCOME TAX-EMPLOYEES' INDIRECT MOVING EXPENSES
In the fall of 1958, the plaintiff was informed by his employer that
he would be required to relocate permanently to a new location in order
to retain his position within the company. The move was made from San
Francisco to Los Angeles and plaintiff incurred both direct and indirect'
moving expenses. Plaintiff's employer, International Business Machines
Corporation, reimbursed plaintiff for all moving expenses incurred. In
addition, a reimbursement was made for the loss plaintiff sustained on the
sale of his residence. The reimbursements for moving expenses were not
included in taxpayer's gross income and the reimbursement for the loss
sustained on the sale of the residence was treated by the taxpayer as an
"amount realized"2 on the sale of the residence. The Internal Revenue
Service 3 treated both reimbursements as additional compensation and
denied taxpayer a deduction.' The Court of Claims, adopting the trial
commissioner's report, held, for the Service: Reimbursements by em-
ployer to employee for indirect moving expenses and for losses on the
sale of residences incurred as a result of an employer-directed move are
compensatory in nature constituting gross income' under the broad
sweep of section 61(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In addition,
no deduction is allowed for indirect moving expenses because of their
personal nature.6 Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
1. Moving expenses have been separated into two categories, (1) direct, and (2) indirect
or extraordinary.
Direct moving expenses are those costs basic or fundamental to moving an employee's
household. Direct moving expenses include the cost of transporting the taxpayer and his
family to the new job location, moving furniture and other household effects from the old to
the new residence and meals and lodging while in transit to the new location.
Indirect moving expenses are those costs incurred as a result of the employee's move, but
are not so basic as to result each time an employee is required to relocate. Indirect moving
expenses are non-transportational expenses. Rev. Rul. 65-158, 1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 34, enu-
merates specific indirect moving expenses. See note 14 infra (Installation of rugs and draperies
at a new residence is an example of indirect moving expenses).
The indirect moving expenses in question were:
(a) Real estate appraisal of plaintiff's residence.
(b) Advertising of residence for sale.
(c) Upkeep of residence pending sale after move to Los Angeles.
(d) Closing costs on purchase of Los Angeles home.
(e) Installation of carpeting in new residence.
(f) Remaking and rehanging draperies in new residence.
2. In theory, when a taxpayer receives back funds which he has invested, these funds are
not considered taxable income, but instead are a return of capital (or "amount realized").
See generally I MERTENS, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 5.06 (1962).
3. Hereinafter referred to as the Service.
4. Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 53.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) states:
[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not
limited to) the following items: (1) compensation for services, including fees, com-
missions and similar items ....
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided...
no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
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Case law' and statutes8 indicate the broad sweep of the definition of
gross income. As early as 1929, gross income was broadly construed by
the United States Supreme Court to include the payments of an employee's
personal income taxes by his employer.9 The Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Lo Bue,' ° in dealing with employee stock options stated, "We
have repeatedly held that in defining 'gross income' as broadly as it did
in § 22(a) [forerunner of § 61(a)] Congress intended to 'tax all gains
except those specifically exempted.' "
Based on the broad concept of the term gross income, the Service's
position was that the taxpayer was denied exclusion of moving expense
reimbursements from gross income."
In 1954, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 54-42912 limiting the
broad concept of the term "gross income," and modifying its position
thereon. This ruling excluded from income certain reimbursements re-
ceived by an employee for moving expenses. The exclusion was limited
to payments received from the employer for direct expenses incurred in
moving the employee and his family from one permanent station to an-
other permanent station." The Service concluded that these payments
were not compensatory in nature because the ruling required that the
move be made primarily for the employer's benefit.
,7. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Commissioner v.
Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court attempted a definition
of income that could serve as a guiding principle for the future. Shortly thereafter, however,
(See C. A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927)) it was prophesied that the scope of the sixteenth
amendment would not forever be limited by this judicial definition (income was defined as
the gain derived from capital, labor, or both), and that taxable income would be judicially
found, although outside the precise scope of the Supreme Court's definition.
The concept of income as defined in Eisner was later abandoned by the Supreme Court
in Glenshaw Glass, when the court stated that the term income is to be given a broad meaning.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 22(a) (forerunner of § 61(a)) provides: "Gross income in-
cludes gains, profits and income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal
services . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid ... T." INt. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 61(a) further expands the gross income definition.
9. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
10. 351 U.S. 243, 246. The court cited to Smith for the proposition that taxable income
includes any economic or financial benefit conferred on an individual, whatever the form or
mode by which it is effected.
11. In Le Grand v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1952), the taxpayer's
employer gave him a portion of the purchase price of a home at his new job site. The court
held the payment to be compensation for continued services and not a gift as the taxpayer
contended.
12. See Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 53.
13. The Service limits the exclusion to direct moving expenses stating:
[I]t is concluded that (1) amounts received by an employee from his employer rep-
resenting allowances or reimbursements for moving himself, his immediate family,
household goods and personal effects, in case of a transfer in the interest of his
employer, from one official station to another for permanent duty . . . are not in-
cludable in the gross income of the employee. . . . [Almounts received as allowances
or reimbursements for meals and lodging of the employee and his family while await-
ing permanent quarters at the new place of duty are includable in gross income of
the employee. (emphasis added)
Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
The Service's position with respect to reimbursed transportation costs of employees has
been inconsistent over the years. Pretermitting an obvious rejoinder that different facts can
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Subsequent to Revenue Ruling 54-429 the Service issued Revenue
Ruling 65-158'" which clarified its previous position toward reimbursed
moving expenses and fortified its position that only direct moving ex-
penses were excludable from gross income. This ruling listed various
reimbursed non-transportational items (indirect expenses), which al-
though related to the move constituted additional compensation.
The courts of appeals have generally followed the Service's position
on including in gross income, reimbursements for moving expenses. 1
In United States v. Woodall, 6 the court held that a reimbursement
to a new 17 employee for expenses incurred in moving himself and his fam-
ily to a new job location constituted taxable income. The court reasoned
the reimbursement was in the nature of a cash bonus as an inducement to
accept employment and emphasized the principle that gross income should
be broadly construed to conclude that the payment was additional com-
pensation.
The Service's position was further followed when the Seventh Circuit
in England v. United States,'8 reversed a district court decision excluding
from gross income, a reimbursement to the taxpayer from his employer,
for indirect moving expenses. The lower court reasoned that since the
taxpayer transferred solely at the request of the employer, any reasonable
produce different results and opinions, the Service's ruling in O.D. 1135, 5 Cum. BULL. 174
(1921), held that transportation costs paid by the Government for dependents of army officers
are in the nature of additional compensation whereas, G.C.M. 18430, 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 137
held that where an employee of the State Department is transferred at the Government's
convenience, the amount received by him as reimbursement for the transportation costs
should be excluded from gross income.
14. 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 34. Examples of non-transportational items includable in gross
income enumerated in the ruling are: preliminary trips to the new place of employment to
locate a suitable residence; the amount by which the net selling price of the employee's
residence at the former place of employment fell below its appraised value; fees incurred in
connection with the sale of the residence and the purchase price of a different residence at the
new place of employment; alteration and installation of rugs and draperies at the new
residence.
This ruling was issued to clarify Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 53, primarily so
the Tax Court could not misconstrue its purpose as the Service feels it did in John E.
Cavanagh, 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
15. Accord, Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1963) (taxpayer, a new
employee, was reimbursed for direct moving expenses and living expenses and the reimburse-
ment was includable in gross income); United States v. Woodall, 255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.
1958) (reimbursed direct moving expenses held includable in gross income for new employee).
The service's position prior to Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 53, was to include
all reimbursed moving expenses in gross income. Rev. Rul. 54-429 was construed as not
applying to new employees. See note 17 infra.
16. 255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1958).
17. Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 53 relates to old employees as clarified by Rev.
Rul. 55-140, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 317 which states:
Expenses incurred by an employee in moving his family and household goods from
one locality to another . . . represent nondeductible expenses under section 24(a) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 [forerunner of § 262, Internal Revenue Code
of 19541 prohibiting the deduction of personal, living, or family expenses. Allowances
or reimbursements for such expenses which are received from the new employer under
the foregoing circumstances must be included in gross income (emphasis added).
18. 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), noted in 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 562 (1966).
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expenses incurred, whether direct or indirect, were really the cost of the
employer. 19 On appeal, the court relied on Revenue Ruling 54-429,2° hold-
ing the reimbursement for indirect moving expenses to be taxable income
to the taxpayer.2' The appellate court stated that Revenue Ruling 54-429
was a permissible interpretation of section 61 (a) of the Code,22 and this
holding substantiated the Service's position once again.
Generally, the position of the courts of appeals is to include in gross
income all indirect moving expense reimbursements along with all moving
expense reimbursements to new employees.
From the standpoint of the Service, the Tax Court has been less
than co-operative on the question of moving expense reimbursements.
Subsequent to Revenue Ruling 54-429 the Tax Court in John E.
Cavanagh2' extended the application of the exclusionary rule to include
reimbursements for direct as well as indirect expenses. The taxpayer was
reimbursed for extraordinary living expenses 24 occasioned by his transfer
to a new job location. The court held the reimbursed indirect expenses to
be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income in that they did not come
within the purview of section 61 (a).25
The Tax Court follows the court of appeals and Service's position in
regard to new employees,'2  holding any reimbursement for moving ex-
penses to be includable in gross income as an inducement to employment
and, therefore, compensatory in nature.2 7
19. The theory underlying the exclusion of reimbursed moving expenses from gross in-
come is that the costs constitute employer costs; accord, J. CIommE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 24 (1968).
20. Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 53.
21. The court stated the following:
The expenses of transporting an employee to a new post of duty for benefit of em-
ployer is properly an expense of the employer, not compensation of the employee,
but the costs of meals, lodging and expenses incidental to securing housing at the
post are personal living expenses of the employee and if they are provided by the
employer, income is realized thereby.
England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986
(1966).
22. Contra, Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743 (1966); John E. Cavanagh, 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
23. 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
24. Under an agreement with his employer, the taxpayer was reimbursed for the amount
of living costs he sustained which were in excess of the ordinary living expenses of his family
while his household effects were in transit. Id.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. A nonaquiescence of Cavanagh was subsequently issued by
the Service, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
The court in extending Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 53, reasoned that income is
not received by an employee, when a reimbursement is received for costs chargeable to the
employer but paid by the employee. The court held the extraordinary expenses incurred by the
employee to be an employer cost and any reimbursement received not to be income under
§ 61(a) of the Code. In England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965), the court
rejected Cavanagh as being incorrectly decided and failing to follow the literal import of REv.
RUL. 54-429.
26. The problem of determining whether a taxpayer is a new or old employee is no
longer at issue in the area of direct moving expenses because under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 217 (applicable to taxpayers after December 31, 1963), direct moving expenses may be
deducted whether the taxpayer is a new or old employee. The problem still appears, however,
in the area of indirect expenses.
27. Accord, Donald W. Haney, 66,010 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1966); Robert L. Wells,
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In Homer H. Starr,"8 the Tax Court solidified its position with respect
to exclusion of indirect moving expense reimbursements from gross
income.
The taxpayer was reimbursed for indirect moving expenses occa-
sioned by an employer-directed move. The court limited the issue to
whether or not the expenditures were incurred primarily in the interest
of petitioner's employer. The court concluded that the indirect expenses
were incurred in the employer's interest and held the reimbursement to be
excludable from gross income as not being compensatory in nature.
The Tax Court rejected the England29 case, concluding that the cases
relied on by the Seventh Circuit were not directly on point. The court
amplified its position by stating the following:
It is our opinion that [the Commissioner's] unqualified state-
ment that indirect moving expenses cannot, under any circum-
stances, be said also to inure primarily to the benefit of the
employer, ignores the economic realities of the situation (em-
phasis added).3°
The Starr case was a significant step for the Tax Court in that
England was rejected and now a split exists between the courts with
respect to the inclusion of reimbursed indirect moving expenses in gross
income.
The treatment of reimbursements for expenses and losses incurred
in the sale of a residence occasioned by an employer-directed move is
most nearly uniform in both the Tax Court and courts of appeals"' with
no change in the future apparent.32 The courts have consistently treated
these reimbursements as additional compensation.83
1 65,103 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1965), aff'd per curiam sub nom., 356 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1966);
Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801 (1963) ; Alan J. Vandermade, 36 T.C. 607 (1961).
28. 46 T.C. 743 (1966); this case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit on December 27, 1967, noted in 15 KAN. L. REV. 394 (1967).
29. 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965).
30. 46 T.C. 743, 746 (1966).
31. It should be pointed out that none of the courts has ever treated this type of re-
imbursement as a moving expense reimbursement.
In Ernest A. Pederson, 46 T.C. 155 (1966), the petitioner argued that Rev. Rul. 54-429,
1954-2 Cum. BULL. 53, was applicable and amounts paid by an employer to an employee for
moving expenses (selling expenses on sale of petitioner's residence) are not compensatory
in nature and excludable from gross income. The Tax Court held that Rev. Rul. 54-429
should not be extended to include such expenses because reimbursements for such expenses
were never treated as moving expense reimbursements.
32. In considering H.R. REP. No. 8363, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964), the legislation which
culminated in the Revenue Act of 1964 and added to the Revenue Code the provision for
certain deductions of moving expenses (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217), the committee on
Finance, United States Senate, proposed an amendment to the house bill which treated re-
imbursements for selling expenses and market value losses as part of the proceeds of the sale
of the old residence (amount realized) if the sale was occasioned by an employer-directed
move. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). This provision was never even brought
up for a vote but was deleted in conference. Co~r. REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
33. Old Employees: Accord, Baum v. United States, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1401 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968); Owen E. Harvey, fT 67,126 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1967); Ernest A. Pederson,
46 T.C. 155 (1966) ; Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963), aff'd sub nom., 324 F.2d 610
(4th Cir. 1963), noted in 18 U. MiA1u L. REV. 714 (1964); contra, Otto Sorg Schairer,
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Prior to 1964 and section 217 of the Code,84 the Service followed a
policy of denying deductions to individuals for moving expenses incurred
because of an employer-directed move. These expenses were regarded as
personal or family expenses85 and the policy was applied to both existing
and new employees, whether the move was made for the convenience of
the employer or not.
Prior to 1954, a deduction for unreimbursed moving expenses,
whether direct or indirect, was generally disallowed in both the Tax Court
and courts of appeals. 8 Subsequent to Revenue Ruling 54-42917 (allow-
ing an exclusion from gross income for reimbursed direct moving ex-
penses), the Tax Court has allowed deductions for direct moving expenses,
while the courts of appeals have disallowed such deductions.8
The Tax Court, in Walter H. Mendel,39 tried to extend Revenue
Ruling 54-429 and held that the unreimbursed direct moving expenses
were deductible as an "ordinary and necessary business expense."4 ° The
court reasoned that if reimbursed expenses were excluded from gross in-
come they could not be personal in nature (otherwise they would be in-
cluded in gross income); therefore, they must be ordinary and necessary
business expenses. The Fourth Circuit reversed,4 however, stating that
while Revenue Ruling 54-429 excluded certain reimbursements from gross
income, it did not make the unreimbursed direct expenses deductible per
se. The court concluded that the expenses constituted non-deductible
living expenses.
The split existing between the Tax Court and courts of appeals with
respect to deductions for moving expenses, was further amplified by
Edward N. Wilson,42 a recent Tax Court case.
In Wilson, the court allowed a deduction for unreimbursed direct
moving expenses.4" The court stated that the concept of the "ordinary
9 T.C. 549 (1947) (reimbursement treated as "amount realized" on sale of residence), over-
ruled by Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963). New Employees: Accord, Arthur J. Kobacker,
37 T.C. 882 (1962).
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 (§ 217 allows deductions for direct moving expenses of
employees).
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
36. York v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (a deduction was denied for
direct moving expenses incurred by taxpayer in moving to a new job location); H. Willis
Nichols, Jr., 13 T.C. 916 (1949) ; Baxter D. McClain, 2 B.T.A. 726 (1925) ; cf. Commissioner
v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) (deduction was denied for travel expenses incurred by tax-
payer from commuting between his home and job location).
37. Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
38. Tax Court: Accord, Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. No. 43 (1968); Vaal R. Dodd,
ff 68,023; P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1968); Walter H. Mendel, 41 T.C. 32 (1963). Courts of
Appeals: Accord, Commissioner v. Mendel, 351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g 41 T.C. 32
(1963) ; cf. Cockrell v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1963); Light v. Commissioner,
310 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1962).
39. 41 T.C. 32 (1963).
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a).
41. Commissioner v. Mendel, 351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965).
42. 49 T.C. 406 (1968).
43. It should be pointed out that INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217 now applies in such
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and necessary" business expense cannot be static or immutable, but must
be flexible. The court found Mendel not to be applicable because the
record in the Wilson case indicated that the expenses incurred were "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expenses, whereas in Mendel the record
was void of such facts.
The instant case is one of first impression in the Court of Claims.
Therefore, the court relied on court of appeals and Tax Court cases in
deciding the case.
The majority of the court adopted the views of the courts of appeals
in following England, along with viewing the historical rise of section
61 (a)"4 and concluded that the reimbursements should be included in the
taxpayer's gross income. The court reasoned that if an employee is reim-
bursed for essentially personal expenses connected with an employer-
directed move, such reimbursements are not excludable from gross in-
come, merely because the expenses would not have been incurred "but
for" the move. The court concluded that the taxpayer's indirect expenses
were personal and, therefore, the reimbursement constituted additional
compensation. The court rejected the "but for" approach in Cavanagh.45
The court treated the reimbursement for the loss sustained on the
sale of the residence as additional compensation following the position of
both the Tax Court and courts of appeals.
In following Mendel4" and denying a deduction to the taxpayer, the
court stated that the indirect moving expenses were personal in nature
and non-deductible under section 262 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
On the basis of the instant case and section 217 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, as provided by the 1964 Revenue Act, which allows a
deduction for direct moving expenses for new or old employees, an equal-
ity exists between all persons incurring moving expenses. The tax treat-
ment for moving expenses on the basis of the instant case and section
217 is: (1) a reimbursed old employee can exclude only direct moving
expenses from gross income and a new employee can deduct these ex-
penses under section 217; (2) an unreimbursed old or new employee can
deduct only direct moving expenses under section 217."7
The instant case, along with the courts of appeals and Service's posi-
tion, put all persons incurring moving expenses on an equal footing. The
Tax Court's position gives an old employee, who is reimbursed for in-
direct expenses, a tax advantage over a reimbursed new employee or an
unreimbursed new or old employee. To resolve the problem of indirect
cases. However, the ruling is significant because it could be a harbinger for allowing indirect
moving expenses to be deductible. In Ritter, Judge Davis dissented in part holding that the
taxpayer should be allowed a deduction for indirect expenses citing Wilson.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
45. 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
46. 351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965).
47. Disregarding the Tax Court cases, tax free treatment is accorded only direct moving
expenses.
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moving expenses a number of approaches must be considered. First, the
Starr case can be reversed or overruled. This in effect would sustain the
courts of appeals and Service's position along with the position of the
court in the instant case. Another approach would be to sustain the Tax
Court's position by the judiciary or legislature, thereby allowing tax free
treatment of indirect moving expenses.
In the writer's opinion, the best solution is the legislative approach.
This would greatly enhance the mobility of the labor force, a public
policy goal clearly a part of the legislative history behind section 217.48
The legislation could provide for an exclusion from gross income of reim-
bursed indirect moving expenses clearly chargeable to the employer, and
allow a deduction for unreimbursed indirect moving expenses.49 Legisla-
tion to this effect enhances the mobility of the labor force and also pro-
vides an equality in the tax treatment of moving expenses for all persons.
IRA ZAGER
48. See statement by Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, Hearing on
the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1964).
49. Legislation similar to this was proposed in H.R. REP. No. 47, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). Despite extensive support the proposed legislation did not come to a vote.
